Coalitional Structure Generation in Skill Games
Incentives for Experimenting Agents
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent’s actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot…
Robust Mechanism Design
Economists’ analysis of mechanism design under incomplete information relies on strong assumptions about economic agents’ beliefs and common knowledge of those beliefs. This talk will survey an approach to mechanism design that aims to relax…
Social Networking Research Area
We conduct research in the area of algorithms, systems, and services where user behaviour is a key factor – this includes algorithmic aspects, design of systems and services, and understanding of user behaviour. Our research…
The Isolation Game: A Game of Distances
The Big Questions of “ICT4D”
Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda
We show that there is a sense in which the Condorcet method (simple majority rue) is less vulnerable to strategic voting than any other reasonable voting rule satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). If we…