{"id":491195,"date":"2018-06-15T06:27:17","date_gmt":"2018-06-15T13:27:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/?post_type=msr-event&p=491195"},"modified":"2025-08-06T11:57:07","modified_gmt":"2025-08-06T18:57:07","slug":"microsoft-research-acm-ec18","status":"publish","type":"msr-event","link":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/event\/microsoft-research-acm-ec18\/","title":{"rendered":"Microsoft Research @ ACM EC’18"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n

Venue:<\/strong> Cornell University (opens in new tab)<\/span><\/a>
\n130 Statler Dr
\nIthaca, New York 14853<\/p>\n

Website:<\/strong> ACM EC’18 (opens in new tab)<\/span><\/a>Opens in a new tab<\/span><\/p>\n

Microsoft is proud to be a sponsor of the Nineteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (opens in new tab)<\/span><\/a> (ACM EC’18). EC is the leading scientific conference on advances in theory, systems, and applications at the interface of economics and computation, including applications to electronic commerce. Several Microsoft researchers will be attending and many have contributed to the program.<\/p>\n

Microsoft Attendees<\/h2>\n

Alex Slivkins<\/a>
\nGlen Weyl<\/a>
\nJames Wright<\/a>
\nJennifer Wortman Vaughan<\/a>
\nMoshe Babaioff<\/a>
\nNicole Immorlica<\/a><\/p>\n

Program Committee Members<\/h2>\n

AGT Mentoring Workshop Organizer: Nicole Immorlica<\/a><\/p>\n

Workshops<\/h2>\n

MD4SG \u201818 (opens in new tab)<\/span><\/a>
\nFriday, June 22, 2018 | 9:00 AM\u20135:30 PM | Room #196<\/h4>\n

Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Noam Nisan, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Zhiwei Steven Wu<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Workshop on Opinion Aggregation, Dynamics, and Elicitation (WADE) (opens in new tab)<\/span><\/a>
\nFriday, June 22, 2018 | 9:00 AM\u20135:30PM | Room #396<\/h4>\n

J. Witkowski, R. Freeman, Jenn Wortman Vaughan<\/strong><\/a>, <\/strong>David Pennock<\/strong><\/a> and A. Krause<\/p>\n

Tutorials<\/h2>\n

The Menu Size of Precise and Approximate Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
\nMonday, June 18, 2018 | 8:30 AM\u201312:30 PM | Room #396<\/h4>\n

Nikhil R. Devanur<\/strong><\/a>, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, and S. Matthew Weinberg<\/p>\n

Opens in a new tab<\/span><\/p>\n

Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 10:45 AM-11:45 AM | Session 1A: Information Acquisition 1 | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 10:45 AM-11:45 AM | Session 1A: Information Acquisition I | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani<\/p>\n

Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 11:55 AM-12:55 PM | Session 2A: Information Acquisition II | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Jinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Bo Waggoner, Zhiwei Steven Wu<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect<\/a>
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 12:55 PM-2:25 PM | Session 3A: Combinatorial Auctions | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren<\/p>\n

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 2:25 PM-3:45 PM | Session 3A: Combinatorial Auctions | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Mohammad Reza Khani<\/strong>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Rad Niazadeh<\/p>\n

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization<\/a>
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 4:15 PM-5:35 PM | Session 4A: Mechanism Design I | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran<\/p>\n

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade<\/a>
\nWednesday, June 20, 2018, 3:30 PM-4:30 PM | Session 6A: Mechanism Design II | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Mingfei Zhao<\/p>\n

Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer<\/a>
\nWednesday, June 20, 2018, 4:30 PM-5:00 PM | Session 7A: Mechanism Design III | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong>,<\/a> Noam Nisan, Aviad Rubinstein<\/p>\n

A\/B Testing
\nThursday, June 21, 2018, 10:00 AM-10:30 AM | Session 8B: Market Experiments | Room #196<\/h4>\n

Eduardo Azevedo, Alex Deng<\/strong>, Jose Montiel Olea, Justin Rao, E. Glen Weyl<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Learning to Bid without Knowing your Value
\nThursday , June 21, 2018, 10:30 AM-11:50 AM | Session 8A: Mechanism Design IV | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Zhe Feng, Chara Podimata, Vasilis Syrgkanis<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and Knapsack
\nThursday, June 21, 2018, 4:00 PM-5:20 PM | Session 10B: Mechanism Design V | Room #196<\/h4>\n

Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Mohammadreza Khani<\/strong>, Saeed Seddighin<\/p>\n

Opens in a new tab<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Microsoft is proud to be sponsors of the Nineteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC). <\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":491267,"template":"","meta":{"msr-url-field":"","msr-podcast-episode":"","msrModifiedDate":"","msrModifiedDateEnabled":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"_classifai_error":"","msr_startdate":"2018-06-18","msr_enddate":"2018-06-22","msr_location":"Ithaca, NY","msr_expirationdate":"","msr_event_recording_link":"","msr_event_link":"http:\/\/www.sigecom.org\/ec18\/registration.html","msr_event_link_redirect":false,"msr_event_time":"","msr_hide_region":false,"msr_private_event":false,"msr_hide_image_in_river":0,"footnotes":""},"research-area":[13548],"msr-region":[197900],"msr-event-type":[197941],"msr-video-type":[],"msr-locale":[268875],"msr-program-audience":[],"msr-post-option":[],"msr-impact-theme":[],"class_list":["post-491195","msr-event","type-msr-event","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","msr-research-area-economics","msr-region-north-america","msr-event-type-conferences","msr-locale-en_us"],"msr_about":"\n\n

Venue:<\/strong> Cornell University (opens in new tab)<\/span><\/a>
\n130 Statler Dr
\nIthaca, New York 14853<\/p>\n

Website:<\/strong> ACM EC’18 (opens in new tab)<\/span><\/a>Opens in a new tab<\/span><\/p>\n

Microsoft is proud to be a sponsor of the Nineteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation<\/a> (ACM EC’18). EC is the leading scientific conference on advances in theory, systems, and applications at the interface of economics and computation, including applications to electronic commerce. Several Microsoft researchers will be attending and many have contributed to the program.<\/p>\n

Microsoft Attendees<\/h2>\n

Alex Slivkins<\/a>
\nGlen Weyl<\/a>
\nJames Wright<\/a>
\nJennifer Wortman Vaughan<\/a>
\nMoshe Babaioff<\/a>
\nNicole Immorlica<\/a><\/p>\n

Program Committee Members<\/h2>\n

AGT Mentoring Workshop Organizer: Nicole Immorlica<\/a><\/p>\n

Workshops<\/h2>\n

MD4SG \u201818<\/a>
\nFriday, June 22, 2018 | 9:00 AM\u20135:30 PM | Room #196<\/h4>\n

Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Noam Nisan, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Zhiwei Steven Wu<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Workshop on Opinion Aggregation, Dynamics, and Elicitation (WADE)<\/a>
\nFriday, June 22, 2018 | 9:00 AM\u20135:30PM | Room #396<\/h4>\n

J. Witkowski, R. Freeman, Jenn Wortman Vaughan<\/strong><\/a>, <\/strong>David Pennock<\/strong><\/a> and A. Krause<\/p>\n

Tutorials<\/h2>\n

The Menu Size of Precise and Approximate Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
\nMonday, June 18, 2018 | 8:30 AM\u201312:30 PM | Room #396<\/h4>\n

Nikhil R. Devanur<\/strong><\/a>, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, and S. Matthew Weinberg<\/p>\n

Opens in a new tab<\/span><\/p>\n

Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 10:45 AM-11:45 AM | Session 1A: Information Acquisition 1 | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 10:45 AM-11:45 AM | Session 1A: Information Acquisition I | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani<\/p>\n

Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 11:55 AM-12:55 PM | Session 2A: Information Acquisition II | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Jinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Bo Waggoner, Zhiwei Steven Wu<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect<\/a>
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 12:55 PM-2:25 PM | Session 3A: Combinatorial Auctions | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren<\/p>\n

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 2:25 PM-3:45 PM | Session 3A: Combinatorial Auctions | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Mohammad Reza Khani<\/strong>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Rad Niazadeh<\/p>\n

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization<\/a>
\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 4:15 PM-5:35 PM | Session 4A: Mechanism Design I | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran<\/p>\n

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade<\/a>
\nWednesday, June 20, 2018, 3:30 PM-4:30 PM | Session 6A: Mechanism Design II | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Mingfei Zhao<\/p>\n

Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer<\/a>
\nWednesday, June 20, 2018, 4:30 PM-5:00 PM | Session 7A: Mechanism Design III | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong>,<\/a> Noam Nisan, Aviad Rubinstein<\/p>\n

A\/B Testing
\nThursday, June 21, 2018, 10:00 AM-10:30 AM | Session 8B: Market Experiments | Room #196<\/h4>\n

Eduardo Azevedo, Alex Deng<\/strong>, Jose Montiel Olea, Justin Rao, E. Glen Weyl<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Learning to Bid without Knowing your Value
\nThursday , June 21, 2018, 10:30 AM-11:50 AM | Session 8A: Mechanism Design IV | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\n

Zhe Feng, Chara Podimata, Vasilis Syrgkanis<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and Knapsack
\nThursday, June 21, 2018, 4:00 PM-5:20 PM | Session 10B: Mechanism Design V | Room #196<\/h4>\n

Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Mohammadreza Khani<\/strong>, Saeed Seddighin<\/p>\n

Opens in a new tab<\/span><\/p>\n","tab-content":[{"id":0,"name":"About","content":"Microsoft is proud to be a sponsor of the Nineteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation<\/a> (ACM EC'18). EC is the leading scientific conference on advances in theory, systems, and applications at the interface of economics and computation, including applications to electronic commerce. Several Microsoft researchers will be attending and many have contributed to the program.\r\n

Microsoft Attendees<\/h2>\r\n

Alex Slivkins<\/a>\r\nGlen Weyl<\/a>\r\nJames Wright<\/a>\r\nJennifer Wortman Vaughan<\/a>\r\nMoshe Babaioff<\/a>\r\nNicole Immorlica<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Program Committee Members<\/h2>\r\n

AGT Mentoring Workshop Organizer: Nicole Immorlica<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Workshops<\/h2>\r\n

MD4SG \u201818<\/a>\r\nFriday, June 22, 2018 | 9:00 AM\u20135:30 PM | Room #196<\/h4>\r\n

Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Noam Nisan, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Zhiwei Steven Wu<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Workshop on Opinion Aggregation, Dynamics, and Elicitation (WADE)<\/a>\r\nFriday, June 22, 2018 | 9:00 AM\u20135:30PM | Room #396<\/h4>\r\n

J. Witkowski, R. Freeman, Jenn Wortman Vaughan<\/strong><\/a>, <\/strong>David Pennock<\/strong><\/a> and A. Krause<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Tutorials<\/h2>\r\n

The Menu Size of Precise and Approximate Revenue-Maximizing Auctions\r\nMonday, June 18, 2018 | 8:30 AM\u201312:30 PM | Room #396<\/h4>\r\n

Nikhil R. Devanur<\/strong><\/a>, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, and S. Matthew Weinberg<\/p>"},{"id":1,"name":"Accepted Papers","content":"

Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition\r\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 10:45 AM-11:45 AM | Session 1A: Information Acquisition 1 | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation\r\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 10:45 AM-11:45 AM | Session 1A: Information Acquisition I | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences\r\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 11:55 AM-12:55 PM | Session 2A: Information Acquisition II | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Jinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Bo Waggoner, Zhiwei Steven Wu<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect<\/a>\r\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 12:55 PM-2:25 PM | Session 3A: Combinatorial Auctions | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions\r\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 2:25 PM-3:45 PM | Session 3A: Combinatorial Auctions | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica<\/strong><\/a>, Mohammad Reza Khani<\/strong>, Brendan Lucier<\/strong><\/a>, Rad Niazadeh<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization<\/a>\r\nTuesday, June 19, 2018, 4:15 PM-5:35 PM | Session 4A: Mechanism Design I | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran<\/p>\r\n\r\n

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade<\/a>\r\nWednesday, June 20, 2018, 3:30 PM-4:30 PM | Session 6A: Mechanism Design II | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong><\/a>, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Mingfei Zhao<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer<\/a>\r\nWednesday, June 20, 2018, 4:30 PM-5:00 PM | Session 7A: Mechanism Design III | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Moshe Babaioff<\/strong>,<\/a> Noam Nisan, Aviad Rubinstein<\/p>\r\n\r\n

A\/B Testing\r\nThursday, June 21, 2018, 10:00 AM-10:30 AM | Session 8B: Market Experiments | Room #196<\/h4>\r\n

Eduardo Azevedo, Alex Deng<\/strong>, Jose Montiel Olea, Justin Rao, E. Glen Weyl<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Learning to Bid without Knowing your Value\r\nThursday , June 21, 2018, 10:30 AM-11:50 AM | Session 8A: Mechanism Design IV | Statler Auditorium<\/h4>\r\n

Zhe Feng, Chara Podimata, Vasilis Syrgkanis<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and Knapsack\r\nThursday, June 21, 2018, 4:00 PM-5:20 PM | Session 10B: Mechanism Design V | Room #196<\/h4>\r\n

Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Mohammadreza Khani<\/strong>, Saeed Seddighin<\/p>"}],"msr_startdate":"2018-06-18","msr_enddate":"2018-06-22","msr_event_time":"","msr_location":"Ithaca, NY","msr_event_link":"http:\/\/www.sigecom.org\/ec18\/registration.html","msr_event_recording_link":"","msr_startdate_formatted":"June 18, 2018","msr_register_text":"Watch now","msr_cta_link":"http:\/\/www.sigecom.org\/ec18\/registration.html","msr_cta_text":"Watch now","msr_cta_bi_name":"Event Register","featured_image_thumbnail":"\"ACM","event_excerpt":"Microsoft is proud to be sponsors of the Nineteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC).","msr_research_lab":[199563,199571],"related-researchers":[],"msr_impact_theme":[],"related-academic-programs":[],"related-groups":[],"related-projects":[],"related-opportunities":[],"related-publications":[],"related-videos":[],"related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-event\/491195","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-event"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/msr-event"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-event\/491195\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1147103,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-event\/491195\/revisions\/1147103"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/491267"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=491195"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"msr-research-area","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/research-area?post=491195"},{"taxonomy":"msr-region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-region?post=491195"},{"taxonomy":"msr-event-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-event-type?post=491195"},{"taxonomy":"msr-video-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-video-type?post=491195"},{"taxonomy":"msr-locale","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-locale?post=491195"},{"taxonomy":"msr-program-audience","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-program-audience?post=491195"},{"taxonomy":"msr-post-option","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-post-option?post=491195"},{"taxonomy":"msr-impact-theme","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/newed.any0.dpdns.org\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-impact-theme?post=491195"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}